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Abstract
This paper proposes a new algorithmic framework, predictor-verifier training,
to train neural networks that are verifiable, i.e., networks that provably satisfy
some desired input-output properties. The key idea is to simultaneously train two
networks: a predictor network that performs the task at hand, e.g., predicting
labels given inputs, and a verifier network that computes a bound on how well
the predictor satisfies the properties being verified. Both networks can be trained
simultaneously to optimize a weighted combination of the standard data-fitting
loss and a term that bounds the maximum violation of the property. Experiments
show that not only is the predictor-verifier architecture able to train networks to
achieve state of the art verified robustness to adversarial examples with much
shorter training times (outperforming previous algorithms on small datasets like
MNIST and SVHN), but it can also be scaled to produce the first known (to the
best of our knowledge) verifiably robust networks for CIFAR-10.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are increasingly being deployed in a wide variety of applications with great success
[11, 18]. However, recently researchers have raised concerns about the robustness of these models.
It has been shown that the addition of small but carefully chosen deviations to the input, so-called
adversarial perturbations, can cause the neural network to make incorrect predictions with very high
confidence [4, 5, 12, 19, 26].
Starting with the work of Szegedy et al. [26], there have been several papers both on understanding
adversarial attacks on neural networks and developing defense strategies against these attacks [1, 21,
24, 30–32]. Recent work has shown that many of the defense strategies proposed in the literature
are really obfuscation strategies, that simply make it harder for gradient-based adversaries to attack
the model by obfuscating gradients in the model and that these defenses are easily broken by
stronger adversaries [2, 28]. Robust optimization techniques, like those developed by Engstrom et al.
[8], Madry et al. [22], overcome this problem since they attempt to find the worst case adversarial
examples at each step during training which they then augment the training batch with. However, they
still do not guarantee that a stronger adversary (for example, one that does brute-force enumeration
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to compute adversarial perturbations) cannot find inputs where that cause the model to predict
incorrectly. Requiring robustness to any adversarial attack is an example of a specification, i.e., a
relationship between the inputs and outputs of the network that must hold for all inputs within a given
set. Verification refers to the problem of checking a specification, for example, finding a proof that
the model is not susceptible to attack by any adversary. Algorithms based on formal verification
[7, 10, 14] and mixed integer programming [9, 27] have been proposed to solve this problem for
networks with piecewise linear activation functions (like ReLUs and maxpooling). However, these
algorithms can take exponential time (since they perform exhaustive enumeration in the worst case)
and are not efficient for large scale machine learning models (the networks considered in these papers
are tiny, typically with a few hundred hidden units).
Even if an efficient verification algorithm is available, it is of limited use if the neural network does
not satisfy the specification of interest, since it does not provide any information on how the network
should be modified so as to satisfy the specification. Hence, there is a need to go beyond data-driven
training of neural networks and towards verified training, where neural networks are trained both to fit
the data and satisfy a specification provably, i.e., with guarantees that the specification is not violated
even for adversarially chosen inputs. Recent work on verified training employs ideas from convex
optimization and duality to construct bounds on an optimization formulation of verification [16, 25].
However, these approaches are limited to either a particular class of activation functions (piecewise
linear models) or particular architectures (single hidden layer, as in [25]) and furthermore, are
computationally intensive since they require solving an optimization problem inside each iteration
of the training loop. The limitations on activation functions and architectures were overcome in a
recent work by Dvijotham et al. [6], where an algorithm is derived to compute bounds on the worst
case violations of a given network with respect to some specification. However, this work focused
on verification of an already trained model and did not consider verified training. Moreover, the
method is inappropriate to be used during training due to the high computational expense of solving
the optimization problems involved in verifying the neural network.
Motivated by the need for a scalable and general purpose approach for verified training, we propose
a new algorithmic framework, predictor-verifier training (PVT). The predictor is a neural network
that performs the task at hand (e.g., classification), while the verifier is a separate neural network that
computes a bound on the worst case violation of the PVT we desire the predictor to satisfy. The two
networks are jointly trained on a loss function that is a weighted combination of the task loss (that
depends only on the predictor) and the dual loss, an upper bound on the worst case violation of the
specification (that depends on the predictor weights and the output of the verifier). More concretely,
the approach exploits the property of duality based verification algorithms in [6] that shows that
any choice of the dual variables provides a valid upper bound on the worst case violation of the
specification. The approach in [6] chooses the dual variables to optimize this bound. However, in the
context of verified training, this introduces significant overhead. Instead, PVT exploits the idea that
the solution of this optimization problem can be learned, i.e., the mapping from a nominal training
example to the optimal dual variables can be learned by the verifier network. Thus, PVT amortizes
the cost of verification over all the training examples and alleviates the burden of performing an
expensive computation such as solving an optimization problem for each training example, as is
required in [16]. Further, since we build upon [6], we are not limited by the kind of architecture or
activation function overcoming the restrictions of the approach in [25] (which is limited to single
hidden layer networks). Thus, we can outperform [16, 25] in terms of clean accuracy (in the absence
of perturbations), verified adversarial accuracy (a lower bound on the test set accuracy under any
adversary using bounded magnitude input perturbations) and training time. To summarize, the key
contributions of our paper are:
(1) A novel training method, predictor-verifier training, that combines training and verification to
train accurate models that are consistent with given specifications, which
• is general-purpose, i.e., applies to arbitrary feedforward architectures with different kinds of
layers (convolutional, batch-norm, ReLU, leaky ReLU, sigmoid, tanh, ELU, etc.),
• enables amortization of the cost of verification across multiple examples resulting in compu-
tational efficiency.
(2) Experimental validation of the efficacy of our approach, showing that it
• outperforms previous algorithms for verified training – achieves state-of-the-art verified
accuracy (under `∞ adversarial perturbations) for MNIST and SVHN,
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• can be scaled to verify models for larger datasets like CIFAR-10 and obtain the first nontrivial
verified accuracy bounds, to the best of our knowledge.
2 Verification using duality
We provide a self-contained recap of the verification approach developed in [6], since we will build
on it to develop PVT (section 3). We focus on neural networks trained for classification tasks, though
other tasks can be handled similarly. In classification, the neural network is fed an input x0 (e.g., an
image) and outputs a vector of un-normalized log-probabilities (hereafter logits) corresponding to
its beliefs about which class x0 belongs to. Generally speaking, the network’s prediction is taken to
be the argmax of the output vector of logits. During training, the network is fed pairs of inputs and
correct output labels, and trained to minimize a misclassification loss, such as the cross-entropy.
2.1 The verification problem
We are concerned with verifying that networks satisfy some specification, and generating a proof, or
certificate, that this holds. We consider a general class of specifications that require that for all inputs
in some nominal set, the network output is contained in a half-space:
cTφ(x0) + d ≤ 0, ∀x0 ∈ Sin, (1)
where c and d define the specification to be verified and φ is the mapping performed by the neural
network.
As shown in [6], many useful verification problems fit this definition (monotonicity with respect to
certain inputs, ensuring that an unsafe label is never predicted when the inputs lie in a given set etc.).
However, in this paper, we will focus on robustness to adversarial perturbations. In the adversarial
setting, an adversary perturbs a nominal input, xnom, in some set, Sin(xnom), and feeds this perturbed
input into the network. For example, if the adversary can perturb the input in `∞ norm up to some
 ≥ 0 then Sin(xnom) = {x | ‖x − xnom‖∞ ≤ }. In the rest of the paper, we will assume that
Sin(xnom) is of this form, although the framework can be extended to other constraints on the input.
Adversarial robustness is achieved if no adversary can succeed in changing the classification outcome
away from the true label ynom, i.e., there is no element x0 in Sin(xnom) such that argmax(φ(x0)) 6=
ynom. In this case we want to verify that for each label i:
(ei − eynom)Tφ(x0) ≤ 0, ∀x0 ∈ Sin (xnom) , (2)
where ei is the ith standard basis vector.
We consider a layered architecture with layers numbered 0, . . . ,K − 1, where the input of layer k
(and consequently the output of layer k − 1) is xk ∈ Rnk , with x0 corresponding to the inputs, and
xK denoting the final output, i.e., the logits. Each layer k has a transfer function, hk : Rnk → Rnk+1 ,
that maps its inputs to outputs. We denote by w all the trainable parameters in the network and by
x the collection of activations at all layers of the network x = (x0, x1, . . . , xK). Searching for a
counter-example to (1) can then be written as an optimization problem:
maximize
x
cTxK + d
subject to x0 ∈ Sin (xnom)
xk+1 = hk(xk), k = 0, . . . ,K − 1.
(3)
If the optimal value of the above optimization problem is smaller than 0, the specification (1) is true.
2.2 Duality based verification
In this section we present an efficient verification method developed in [6] based on a dual relaxation
of problem (3). We start by outlining the relevant assumptions.
Supported transfer functions. The verification method restricts the transfer functions to be simple,
where we define simple as follows:
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Definition 1. A function h : Rn → Rm is simple if one can efficiently solve
maximize µTx− λTh(x)
subject to l ≤ x ≤ u, (4)
over variable x ∈ Rn, for fixed λ ∈ Rm, and µ, l, u ∈ Rn.
We will also assume that the transfer functions are amenable to backpropagation with respect to
any parameters they may have. The above definition uses the term ‘efficiently solve’, which is
intentionally ambiguous but could be taken to mean that the problem has a closed-form solution,
or can be solved using convex optimization etc.; we just assume access to a cheap oracle for the
problem. In that case this definition covers a wide range of commonly used functions, including most
of those used in modern network architectures. For example, it includes any affine function, e.g.,
h(x) = Wx + b, since in this case the problem (4) has a closed form solution. Furthermore, any
component-wise non-linearity falls into this category, since in that case problem (4) is decomposable
into several independent scalar problems, which in the worst case we could solve by discretizing the
interval. Other functions like max-pool also fall into this category, since in that case the solution to
problem (4) can be computed by solving small problems each of which has a closed-form solution, and
taking the maximum [6]. Consequently, this formulation covers most state-of-the-art (non-recurrent)
deep learning architectures, since affine transfer functions include convolutions, average pooling,
batch normalization (once the parameters are fixed) etc., and the non-linearities can include ReLU,
sigmoid, tanh and others. Similarly, skip connections, as popularized in the ResNet architecture
[13], can be formulated in this way by judicious choice of weight matrix and non-linearity. Bound
propagation. In this paper we work with the set Sin (xnom) = {x : ‖x− xnom‖∞ ≤ } for some
 > 0. Then the upper and lower bounds on x0 are simply xnom −  ≤ x0 ≤ xnom + . The following
simple bound propagation approach can then be used to find bounds on subsequent layers: At layer k,
for each output index i = 1, . . . , nk+1, the following pair of problems is solved:
max / min eTi hk(x)
subject to lk ≤ x ≤ uk (5)
over variable x ∈ Rnk , where ei is the ith standard basis vector, and uk, lk are the upper and lower
bounds on the outputs from the previous layer. The resulting maximum and minimum values are
the upper and lower bounds, respectively, for the inputs to the next layer. Problem (5) can be solved
efficiently due to the assumption that the transfer function defining each layer is simple. For example,
if h is a non-decreasing component-wise non-linearity (e.g., ReLU), then the bounds at the output
are simply l′ = h(l), u′ = h(u). When h is the affine function h(x) = Wx + b, then the output
bounds are given by: l′ =W+l+W−u+ b, u′ =W+u+W−l+ b where W+ = max (W, 0) and
W− = min (W, 0). These bounds can be computed at the same time as a forward pass through the
neural network at a constant overhead and hence are efficient to compute.
Verification. The verification problem (3) is NP-hard so computing the exact optimal value in general
is difficult [14]. However, in order to verify the specification (1), it suffices to prove that the optimal
value is bounded above by 0. Thus, Dvijotham et al. [6] relax the optimization problem (3) by
introducing Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the equality constraints, to obtain the problem
ζ (λ;xnom,w) = maximize
x
cTxK + d+
K−1∑
k=0
λTk (xk+1 − hk(xk))
subject to x0 ∈ Sin (xnom)
lk ≤ xk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,K
(6)
assuming any fixed values for λk. The optimal value as a function of λ = {λk, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1}
is known as the dual function and denoted ζ (λ;xnom,w), acknowledging its dependence on xnom,w.
Notice how the known bounds on xk are introduced into this formulation. The introduction of valid
constraints does not make any difference to the solution, but the bounds help make the Lagrangian
relaxation tighter and compute better upper bounds on the optimal value of (3). This optimization
problem over x can be solved in closed form based on the assumption that the transfer functions are
simple – we leave the details for Appendix A.1 noting that they are similar to [6]. For any choice
of λ, the objective value provides an upper bound on the optimal value of problem (3). A sufficient
condition to verify (1) is finding a λ such that dual function is non-positive, in other words:
∃λ such thatζ (λ;xnom,w) < 0 =⇒ cTφ(x0) + d ≤ 0, ∀x0 ∈ Sin (xnom) , (7)
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Algorithm 1 Predictor-Verifier Training
input: Dataset D; loss weighting κ; Stepsizes {βt}∞t=0
initialize: Neural network parameters θ0 (of the verifier), w0 (of the predictor) randomly
for time-step t = 0, 1, . . . , do
Sample input minibatch {(xi, yi)}mi=1 ⊆ D
Compute loss function estimate Lˆ using (8) on minibatch.
θt+1 ← θt − βt ∂Lˆt∂θ (Improve verifier to reduce verified dual bound)
wt+1 ← wt − βt ∂Lˆt∂w (Improve the predictor and make it more verifiable)
end for
and the dual variable provides a certificate that the property holds. On the other hand, if we find an
x0 ∈ Sin(xnom) such that the optimal value of (3) is positive, then we have found a counter example
which is as a certificate that the property does not hold. Note that the dual function ζ(·;xnom,w) is
convex, and so minimizing it can be done efficiently [3]. However, we only need to find a λ for which
the objective value is smaller than zero, so it is not required to minimize the function exactly. This
motivates the approach of Dvijotham et al. [6], where the authors apply a subgradient method which
for all steps maintains a valid upper bound on the optimal value of (3) that gets progressively tighter.
The most important properties that we use in the following sections are that any choice of λ provides a
valid upper bound on (6), and if that upper bound is smaller than zero then that λ is a valid certificate
to verify that the property holds. We shall exploit this to train a neural network to output the dual
variables, for a particular input x0. If the dual variables were required to satisfy constraints to be
valid (this is the case with the formulation in [16]), or if they needed to exactly optimize an objective
to be a certificate (as in the case of exhaustive search methods), then a neural network, which is
approximate by its very nature, would not be able to produce them. Further, the dual objective ζ is
(sub)-differentiable with respect to λ and w, which allows backpropagation to be used to train neural
networks to produce near-optimal dual variables.
3 Predictor-Verifier Training
In this section, we discuss how the verification approaches from the previous section can be folded
into neural network training approaches in order to learn networks that are guaranteed to satisfy the
specification. The key idea is to exploit the fact that the dual optimization problem shares a lot of
structure across training examples, so that the solution of the optimization problem λ? (x,w) =
argminλ ζ (λ;x,w) can be “learned”, i.e., a neural network can be trained to approximate the
optimal solution λ? given x,w. This alleviates the burden of solving the above optimization problem
within each iteration in the training loop. This is done by using a verifier network V to predict
the dual variables given the input example. As the network trains, the verifier learns to produce
dual variables that approximately minimize the upper bound (i.e., provide tighter bounds) and the
predictor adjusts its weights so that the violation of the specification is minimized. The entire process
is amenable to backpropagation and training with standard stochastic gradient algorithms (or variants
thereof), making the training of verifiable models very similar to regular training. Concretely, we
train two networks simultaneously:
1) A predictor P , that takes as input the data to be classified x0 and produces the logits as output.
The predictor is parameterized by w.
2) A verifier V , that takes the activations x produced by the predictor and the corresponding label y
as input and produces as output the dual variables λ. The verifier is parameterized by θ.
The training objective for PVT (Algorithm 1) can be stated as follows:
minimize
w,θ
E(x,y)∼P [(1− κ)` (P (x;w), y) + κ log (1 + ζ (V (x, y; θ) ;x,w))] . (8)
where ` is the supervised learning loss function (e.g., cross-entropy) and ζ is the dual objective
function from (7), κ is a hyperparameter that governs the relative weight of satisfying the speci-
fication versus fitting the data and P is the data generating distribution. Based on the empirical
risk minimization principle [29], this can be approximated with an empirical average over training
samples.
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x0
x1 = W0x0 + b0
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entropy loss
y
Predictor
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(a) Direct
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(b) Backward-forward
Figure 1: Examples of predictor-verifier network architectures.
This stands in contrast to prior work, where the dual variables for each training example are obtained
by solving an optimization problem. Solving an optimization problem for every training example is
a significant overhead even if it is only done on a minibatch of examples in every step of training.
In Kolter and Wong [16], this computational overhead is alleviated to some degree by posing the
gradient descent required to solve the dual optimization problem as backpropagation. However,
despite this convenient reformulation, one still needs to solve an optimization problem for every
example in the minibatch. The approach in Raghunathan et al. [25] sidesteps this by computing
bounds that are valid for any training example, but this approach is limited to single hidden layer
networks and still requires solving a semidefinite program for each pair of classes, which is still
computationally intensive.
PVT enables to overcome these limitations and scale up verified training to much larger models than
that of previous approaches, while also making the training much faster even when compared to
standard (non-verified) adversarial training [22]. Furthermore, as the verification bound is computed
simply via a forward pass through the verifier network, the computational complexity of the verifica-
tion procedure is linear in the size of the network. Since modern image classification architectures
can contain millions of neurons, the asymptotic improvement obtained through learning is necessary
to allow scalable verification and training of verifiable models.
3.1 Architecture of the verifier
We consider various choices for the architecture of the verifier network:
Constant verifier: As the simplest option, we consider a trivial architecture that always predicts zero
dual variables: V (x, y; θ) = 0 for any x, y. In this case, the verifier has no trainable parameters. This
is equivalent to naive estimation of activation bounds based on simple bound propagation (Section
2.2), which lacks the ability to model dependencies across activations.
Direct architecture: The direct architecture predicts the dual variables independently for each layer,
i.e., for layer k it digests its inputs xk and the final target label y, and predicts the corresponding dual
variable λk. This architecture predicts independently dual variables for each layer-wise constraint of
the original problem (3). Figure 1a shows an example of such an architecture on a predictor network
composed of two hidden layers and a final linear layer that outputs logits. We can see that each set of
duals λk are predicted from the corresponding layer inputs and the target label.
Backward-forward architecture: The dual optimization (6) can be viewed as a dynamic program-
ming problem, where the stages of the dynamic program are layers in the neural network. The details
are presented in Appendix A.2. This can be used to derive a backward-forward architecture for the
verifier, illustrated in Figure 1b. This architecture uses the output xk+1 of each layer k and propagates
information downwards to create an intermediate representation (corresponding to the backward pass
in a dynamic program). Each component of the backward pass extracts relevant information that is
used in a subsequent forward pass. Finally, the forward pass takes the input of the each layer xk and
the intermediate information computed by the backward pass to predict the dual variables λ.
6
Table 1: Comparison with the state-of-the-art. Methods are evaluated in terms of the test error (no
attack), the currently strongest PGD attack [22], and the provable upper bound on the adversarial
error.  is the size of the `∞ attack for pixel values in [0, 1], e.g.,  = 0.03 corresponds roughly to an
8 pixel attack when pixel values are in [0, 255]. All methods use comparable ConvNet architectures.
*For comparison, the last line shows the best achievable adversarial accuracy using a much larger
model on CIFAR-10.
PROBLEM METHOD  TEST ERROR PGD ATTACK BOUND
MNIST Baseline 0.1 0.77% 52.94% 100.00%
MNIST Kolter and Wong [16] 0.1 1.80% 4.11% 5.82%
MNIST Madry et al. [22] 0.1 0.60% 4.66% 100.00%
MNIST Predictor-Verifier 0.1 1.20% 2.87% 4.44%
SVHN Baseline 0.01 6.57% 87.45% 100.00%
SVHN Kolter and Wong [16] 0.01 20.38% 33.74% 40.67%
SVHN Madry et al. [22] 0.01 7.04% 23.63% 100.00%
SVHN Predictor-Verifier 0.01 16.59% 33.14% 37.56%
CIFAR-10 Baseline 0.03 26.27% 99.99% 100.00%
CIFAR-10 Madry et al. [22] 0.03 39.00% 68.08% 100.00%
CIFAR-10 Predictor-Verifier 0.03 51.36% 67.28% 73.33%
CIFAR-10 Madry et al. [22]* 0.03 12.7 % 54.2 % 100.00%
4 Experimental results
We demonstrate that PVT can train verifiable networks, compare to the state-of-the-art, and discuss
the impact of the verifier architecture on the results. For all datasets, we use a ConvNet architecture,
comparable to the one used in Kolter and Wong [16]: the input image is passed through two
convolutional layers (with 16 and 32 channels and strides of 1 and 2, respectively), followed by two
fully connected layers stepping down to 100 and then 10 (the output dimension) hidden units; ReLUs
follow each layer except the last. Further details on the implementation and parameters are available
in Appendix A.3.
4.1 PVT and state-of-the-art
Experimentally, we observe that either the direct or the backward-forward architecture achieve the
best verified bounds on adversarial error rates. We compare these best-performing models (i.e. using
tuned κ values) to three alternative approaches. The baseline is the network trained in a standard
manner with just the cross-entropy loss. The second algorithm is adversarial training, following
Madry et al. [22], which generates adversarial examples on the fly during training and adds them to
the training set. The third algorithm is from Kolter and Wong [16] – we only perform this comparison
on MNIST and SVHN benchmarks, as they do not test their approach on CIFAR-10.
Table 1 contains the results of these comparisons. Compared to Kolter and Wong [16], our predictor-
verifier training (PVT) achieves lower error rates under normal and adversarial conditions, as well
as better verifiable bounds, setting the state-of-the-art in verified robustness to adversarial attacks.
PVT outperforms adversarial training [22], achieving lower error rates against adversarial attacks of
2.87% on MNIST and 67.28% on CIFAR-10 for this particular ConvNet architecture. In addition,
our networks are provably robust while the adversarially trained networks only achieve the trivial
upper bound of 100% adversarial error rate - this shows that training networks to be verifiable is
critical to obtaining networks with good verified bounds on adversarial accuracy. However, our
networks do have much higher nominal test error (without adversarial perturbations), making space
for improvement in future work. We note that on CIFAR-10 our trained network is the first to achieve
a non-trivial verified upper bound on adversarial error. Finally, PVT takes 6 minutes to reach the
same performance as [16] on MNIST. Kolter and Wong [16] take 5 hours to train their model on
MNIST, using a slightly weaker GPU (Titan X versus our Titan Xp). To reach our best performance,
we take 20 minutes. Compensating for the difference in hardware, we are roughly 25× faster.
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Figure 2: (a) The effect of the perturbation radius on the verified bound for the MNIST PVT model.
(b) The decrease in the verified upper bound on MNIST adversarial error rate as a function of time
taken by the verification algorithm (per test example) for the PVT and Madry et al. [22] models.
Table 2: Comparison of verifier architectures. Methods are evaluated in terms of the test error (no
attack), the currently strongest PGD attack [22], and the verified bound on adversarial error, obtained
directly using dual variables predicted by the verifier network. For this table, all models use κ = 1.
PROBLEM ARCHITECTURE  TEST ERROR PGD ATTACK BOUND*
MNIST Constant 0.1 1.29% 3.08% 5.00%
MNIST Direct 0.1 1.20% 2.87% 4.44%
MNIST Backward-forward 0.1 1.28% 3.07% 4.72%
SVHN Constant 0.01 24.80% 38.03% 45.92%
SVHN Direct 0.01 22.50% 35.98% 42.93%
SVHN Backward-forward 0.01 16.59% 33.14% 41.52%
CIFAR-10 Constant 0.03 60.12% 69.32% 72.21%
CIFAR-10 Direct 0.03 59.38% 67.68% 70.79%
CIFAR-10 Backward-forward 0.03 58.89% 68.05% 71.36%
4.2 Verification time and importance of verified training
We also compare our models with those produced by the approach from Madry et al. [22] in terms of
verifiability. We were unable to obtain convolutional models using adversarial training that could be
verified to obtain non-trivial bounds on adversarial accuracy, hence we resorted to using smaller fully
connected models trained with L1 regularization, for which we were able to obtain non-trivial verified
bounds on adversarial accuracy. The results shown in Figure 2 illustrate two important points: (a)
The models trained with PVT are very easy to verify, where with a budget of 15ms per test example,
we are able to achieve nearly optimal bounds on the adversarial error rate, which can be seen from
the gap between the solid lines (verified bounds) and dashed grey lines (CW attack) (Figure 2a); and
(b) The models trained with adversarial training, even with tuned L1 regularization, achieve weaker
verified bounds than the PVT model for any limit on verification time (Figure 2b).
4.3 Comparison of verifier architectures in PVT
Table 2 compares the performance of different verifier architectures. For this table and to facilitate
comparisons, we set κ = 1 for all models (hence we expect the nominal error rate to increase w.r.t.
Table 1). The last column of the table corresponds to the verified bound obtained directly using the
dual variables predicted by the verifier network, hence it is higher than the fully verified bounds
shown in Table 1. As expected, the constant architecture performs the worst as it systematically gets
higher nominal and verified error rates. The direct architecture is competitive against the backward-
forward architecture. However, on SVHN the difference is more pronounced as the backward-forward
architecture achieves a much lower nominal error rate.
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5 Conclusions
We have presented a novel approach for training of verified models – we believe that this is a
significant step towards the vision of specification-driven ML. Our experiments have shown that the
proposed predictor-verified approach outperform competing techniques in terms of tightness of the
verified bounds on adversarial error rates and nominal error rates in image classification problems,
while also training faster. In the future, we plan to apply the predictor-verifier framework to bigger
datasets like ImageNet and to extend it to handle complex specifications encountered in real-world
machine learning tasks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Closed form dual objective function
This derivation mimics that in [6] closely, but we reproduce it here for completeness. Our goal is to
show that the optimization problem
maximize cTxK + d+
K−1∑
k=0
λTk (xk+1 − hk(xk))
subject to x0 ∈ Sin (xnom)
lk ≤ xk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,K
(9)
over variable x can be solved efficiently for fixed λ, where we assume for ease of exposition that
Sin(xnom) = {x | ‖x− xnom‖∞ ≤ } for some  ≥ 0. We begin by rearranging the objective:
maximize (c+ λK−1)
T
xK + d+
K−1∑
k=1
(
(λk−1)
T
xk − λTk hk(xk)
)
− λT0 h0(x0)
subject to xnom −  ≤ x0 ≤ xnom + 
lk ≤ xk ≤ uk, k = 1, . . . ,K.
(10)
The objective function is separable, i.e., is a sum of terms each of which depends on a single xk. The
constraints are also separable, i.e., each constraint only involves a single xk. Thus, the optimization
can be solved independently for each xk. For k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, we have
maximize
lk≤xk≤uk
(λk−1)
T
xk − λTk hk(xk),
and due to our assumption that the transfer functions hk are simple, this optimization problem can be
solved efficiently. We denote the optimal value fk (λk−1, λk). For k = 0, we have
maximize
‖x0−xnom‖∞≤
−λ0Th0(x0)
which can be solved similarly; we denote the optimal value f0 (λ0). For k = K, we have
maximize
lK≤xK≤uK
(c+ λK−1)
T
xK
which can be solved in closed form by setting each component of xK to be its upper bound (uK) or
lower bound (lK) depending on whether the corresponding component of c+ λK is positive or not.
We denote the optimal solution by fK (λK−1). Thus, the dual objective can be written as
f0 (λ0) + fK (λK−1) +
K−1∑
k=1
fk (λk−1, λk) . (11)
A.2 Derivation of backward-forward architecture
This architecture of the verifier is motivated by the structure of the dual function (11). Each term
in the objective function depends on a single λk or on a pair of adjacent λk−1, λk. The dual
optimization problem is to minimize eq. (11) over λ. This can be solved as a dynamic program. The
recursion proceeds as follows: compute the value function FK−1(λK−1) = fK−1 (λK−1), then for
k = K − 2, . . . , 0 compute
Fk(λk) = min
λk+1
fk+1 (λk, λk+1) + Fk+1 (λk+1) . (12)
The optimal value is then given by minλ0 F0 (λ0) and the optimal solutions can be computed by
starting from λ?0 = argminλ0 F0 (λ0) and then for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1 calculating
λ?k = argmin
λk
fk
(
λ?k−1, λk
)
+ Fk (λk) . (13)
While this procedure can be described in theory, it may not necessarily be implementable. This is
because the value functions (12) may not have a closed form expression. Thus, it may not possible to
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represent them using a finite amount of computation or storage. A standard approach to overcome
this problem is to use a parametric approximation of the value functions Fk. However, our goal in
this paper is not to approximate the value functions, but use to it to construct an architecture that
can produce λ given activations x and label y. In doing this, we try to mimic the computational
graph structure. Let Gk and Ek, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, be (typically small) neural networks that we
will use to approximate the backward-forward computations of (12) and (13). Then starting with
ηK−1 = GK−1 (xK , y), we compute activations k = K − 2, . . . , 0 as
ηk = Gk (ηk+1, xk+1) . (14)
This computation runs backward through the layers of the network to produce η0. Then, the λ can be
computed as follows, starting from λ0 = E0 (η0, x0), we compute for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1
λk = Ek(λk−1, ηk). (15)
The systems of equations (14) and (15) together constitute a mapping from (x, y) to λ and can be
trained end-to-end to minimize the dual bound. This structure is represented by the backward-forward
architecture described in section 3.1. We can denote this mapping
λ = T (x, y; θ)
where θ is the set of all parameters of the ‘dual’ networks Gk and Ek, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1. As long as
G and E are differentiable, so is T and its derivatives can be computed using backpropagation. Note
that since the activations x depends on the weights of the predictor network w we can backpropagate
the gradient of the loss both into the θ parameters and into the w parameters.
A.3 Implementation details
Here we provide additional implementation details on the model architectures, training procedure,
and how we improved the speed of bound propagation.
Details of verifier architectures. For the direct architecture, we predict each set of dual variables
using two fully connected layers stepping down to 200 and then up to the required number of dual
variables (the output dimension); ReLU follows the first layer. For the backward-forward architecture,
the backward path for each set of dual variables is a single layer of size 200 followed by a ReLU, and
the forward path uses two fully connected layers stepping down to 200 and then up to the required
number of dual variables.
Datasets and training data augmentation. Throughout the paper, we concentrate on three widely
used datasets: MNIST [20], SVHN [23] and CIFAR-10 [17]. For MNIST, following standard practice,
no data augmentation is performed, apart from for the adversarial training baseline Madry et al. [22]
which augments the training data with adversarial examples. For SVHN, we train on random 28× 28
crops of images in the training set (without extras) and evaluate on 28× 28 central crops of the test
set. For CIFAR-10, we train on random 28× 28 crops and horizontal flips, and evaluate on 28× 28
central crops.
Training procedure. The networks were trained using the Adam [15] algorithm with an initial
learning rate of 10−3. We train for 90, 80 and 240 epochs with batch sizes of 100, 50 and 50 on
MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10 respectively. The value of κ was tuned independently for each dataset,
but as we will see in Appendix A.4 there is a trade-off between nominal and adversarial accuracy.
Ultimately, for MNIST we chose κ = 1, for SVHN κ = 1 and for CIFAR-10 κ = 0.5. We also
found it necessary to linearly anneal the perturbation radius  during the first half of the training
steps between 0 and the required value, i.e. 0.1, 0.01 and 0.03 on MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10,
respectively. Finally, we added L1-regularization to the predicted dual variables with scale 10−6 in
order to force the verifier to concentrate on a smaller subset of dual variables.
Efficient bound propagation for affine layers. As explained in Section 2.2, given bounds on the
inputs l ≤ x ≤ u to a transfer function h, it is useful to be able to efficiently compute bounds on
the outputs l′ ≤ h(x) ≤ u′. For exposition clarity, the main paper presents a suboptimal way of
propagating the bounds for an affine function h(x) =Wx+ b as follows:
l′ = W+l +W−u+ b
u′ = W+u+W−l + b
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Figure 3: Trade-off between the nominal error rate (without any adversarial perturbations and the
verified upper bound on (a) MNIST with  = 0.1 and (b) CIFAR-10 with  = 0.03
where W+ = max (W, 0) and W− = min (W, 0).
In fact, it is possible to halve the number of operations needed to compute the output bounds – let
us reparametrize bounds by representing them as centre c = (l + u)/2 and radius r = (u − l)/2;
conversely l = c− r and u = c+ r. Then, the output bounds are simply
c′ = Wc+ b
r′ = |W |r
Therefore, only two affine operations are required to propagate bounds for affine transfer functions,
compared to four of the original parametrization. Switching between parametrizations depending on
h (for element-wise non-linearities (l, u) is better, while for affine (c, r) is more efficient) incurs a
slight computational overhead, but since affine layers are typically the most computationally intensive
ones (fully connected layers, convolutions, etc.), the 2× speedup is worth it.
A.4 Other experimental results
Figure 3 shows the effect of κ on the nominal (without any adversarial perturbations) and verified
error rate. For this plot, we trained multiple models with different values of κ ranging between 0.05
and 1 on MNIST and CIFAR-10 and report the performance of these models at the end of training.
We observe a clear anti-correlation between the nominal error rate and the verified upper bound.
Indeed, as we force the model to prefer the maximization of the nominal accuracy (i.e. by setting κ
close to zero), robustness takes a hit.
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